The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, published in 1962, emerged against the backdrop of the philosophical context of positivism. Positivism, a school of thought prominent in the late 19th and early 20th-centuries, held that the only meaningful knowledge is empirical knowledge derived from sensory experience and that scientific inquiry should adhere strictly to empirical observation and the scientific method.

Positivism, as espoused by philosophers such as Auguste Comte and Ernst Mach, emphasized the pursuit of objective, verifiable facts and the rejection of metaphysical speculation or unobservable entities in scientific discourse. This philosophical framework laid the groundwork for a vision of science characterized by continuous, cumulative progress and the steady accumulation of knowledge. Positivism’s influence extended to various disciplines, shaping the scientific worldview and contributing to a belief in the linear and objective development of scientific understanding.

However, Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions challenged the positivist perspective and introduced a more nuanced and dynamic view of scientific progress. Kuhn’s work can be understood as a response to the limitations and assumptions of positivism, offering an alternative framework that recognizes the inherently complex and non-linear nature of scientific development.