Having distinguished between hereditary and representative principles in government, Paine proceeds to compare the constitutions they produce. He begins by describing the Pennsylvania state constitution of 1776 and the US federal constitution of 1787, including the processes by which they were formed. In each case, the sovereign people called special constitutional conventions, and the existing governments were not involved in the deliberations. The people of England, on the other hand, played no role in the forming of their so-called “constitution.” What is called the “British constitution,” Paine argues, simply emerged bit by bit over the centuries. Paine concludes that Britain has a government, but it does not have a genuine, stand-alone constitution, as whatever the government does becomes part of its “constitution.” With no actual constitution to cite, the British constitution’s defenders can only talk of precedents. 

Paine then shifts to an analysis of the parts that tend to make up constitutions, for no two are alike, even in the republican states of America. He reduces the division of constitutional powers to “legislative” and “executive,” arguing that the judicial power actually belongs under the executive heading. He assesses the pros and cons of unicameral (having a single legislative house or body) legislatures and bicameral (having two separate houses or bodies) legislatures.