The first of the two, short concluding chapters, Chapter 8 focuses in particular on Lieutenant Colonel Monterrosa. Danner begins by putting the massacre at El Mozote and its effects in context within the larger Salvadoran conflict, calling it “the climax of the era of the great massacres” (140). Afterward, the tactics of the Salvadoran army shifted away from shock and awe, partly because they saw the effectiveness of the guerrilla propaganda that came out of the El Mozote massacre, and partly because it had accomplished what they wanted it to accomplish: “El Mozote was, above all, a statement [...] In the end, the guerrillas can’t protect you, and we, the officers and soldiers, are willing to do absolutely anything to avoid losing this war” (141).

Even if the outcome of the war had not become certain in the wake of El Mozote, “it had become less certain that [the Army] would lose” (141). El Salvador elected a center-right provisional president, Magaña, who helped “placate Congress,” and the narrative of El Mozote in the US shifted from “there is no evidence to confirm” that a massacre happened to there is “no evidence to support” the charges (141-42).