Nietzsche attacks the Christian practice of championing martyrdom, arguing that dying for a cause does not validate its truth—that glorifying martyrdom only cheapens life by making a seduction of death.

As a counterpoint to the martyr (who is killed for their conviction) and the convicted (who forsakes their will to power), Nietzsche offers the skeptic, unbound by conviction and empowered to argue any point.

He argues that those with convictions make slaves of themselves and glorify slavery by closing their eyes in willful ignorance until they become fanatics.

He calls out historical figures “Savonarola, Luther, Rousseau, Saint-Simon” as such fanatics lost to the slavery of conviction (64). 

Nietzsche asks: “Is there any actual difference between a lie and a conviction?” (65). He recalls the contemporary German belief that Rome was despotic, and the Germans brought freedom by overthrowing it. Instead, Nietzsche argues that the notion of “we respect all convictions” did not bring freedom but more faces to slavery (65).

He describes the priests’ intentions as coercing others into faith by erasing notions of truth and lies via convictions, claiming that facts do not apply to God and thus whatever they say is to be followed without question.