Beevor theorizes that, as the German attack on the Caucuses slowed and the logistical strains of war across a huge front impacted the Wehrmacht, Hitler may have realized Russia would not be defeated in 1943. Potentially, Hitler understood that he would not win the war in the east. Instead, he fixated on the symbolic victory of seizing Stalingrad. The Soviets also fixed on Stalingrad. Their propaganda emphasized the danger of Germans, often framing their invasion as a sexual violation of the motherland that echoed the real German violations of Russian civilians. On September 12, Chuikov was appointed commander of Stalingrad. He understood his task was to “defend the city or die in the attempt” (127). Chuikov began this by using the NKVD to secure all main places through which people could flee across the Volga, giving them orders to shoot deserters.

Also on September 12, Hitler met with Paulus and the other commanders of Army Group B. Paulus told Hitler that Stalingrad would be taken within 10 days, with 14 more needed for regrouping. The next day, the first stage of the German attack on Stalingrad began with an air and artillery attack on Soviet positions followed by infantry assaulting and Panzer Army assaults by land, making significant gains by September 14.