On Revolution (1963) is a work of political theory by the German American political philosopher Hannah Arendt. On Revolution presents a comparative analysis of the 18th-century American and French Revolutions, arguing that the former was successful because it established a durable constitutional republic, whereas the latter, even though it was much more widely studied and emulated than the American, was a disaster because it disintegrated into state terror. The key difference, Arendt argues, is that in France the revolutionary goal of establishing a new form of government based on the active participation of citizens was displaced by the social goal of eliminating mass poverty, while in America it was not.

Considered one of the most influential political thinkers of the post-World War II era, Arendt was a Jew who fled Nazi Germany and spent time in a French internment camp before settling in New York City in 1941. She was a prolific writer and taught at a number of American universities. Her works on political theory and 20th-century totalitarianism, including The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) and Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), remain widely read and are still considered highly influential.

This guide uses the 2006 Penguin Classics edition.

Summary

On Revolution has an Introduction and six lengthy chapters. In Chapter 1, Arendt distinguishes revolution from other forms of political violence—such as rebellion, coup, or civil war—in terms of outcome: Only a revolution produces not simply change, but an entirely new form of government based on popular sovereignty. In both America and France, the revolutionists were initially concerned with establishing institutions in which citizens could enjoy “political freedom,” meaning the ability to participate directly in public affairs. Citizens had experienced such freedom in ancient Greece and Rome, but subsequently it had become the privilege only of monarchs and hereditary elites.

In Chapter 2, Arendt describes how the outbreak of revolution in France brought masses of common people into the streets to protest conditions of abject poverty. She argues that this development led the revolutionists to prioritize satisfying the material needs of the poor above establishing new political institutions. Inspired by the 18th-century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose notion of the “general will” sought to replace the unitary will of the monarch with the similarly unitary will of “the people,” they elevated compassion for the suffering poor as the highest political virtue. In the name of this ideal, they excused violence and gross civil-rights violations. This was the turning point of the French Revolution, Arendt argues, and it inspired subsequent theorists of revolution to focus on solving social problems instead of institutionalizing freedom. This was a tragic mistake, in her view, because efforts to solve the problem of poverty through political means have never succeeded and have always, instead, engendered terror.

In Chapter 3, Arendt claims that the American revolutionists avoided this fate because mass poverty did not exist among the white American colonists, thanks to the abundance of the American natural environment. Moreover, the white colonists were suspicious of unanimity and valued the diversity and plurality of the citizenry. Due to the colonists’ historical experience of forming mutual compacts for local self-governance, they knew that political participation was not a burdensome obligation, but a fulfilling experience for those who choose it.

In Chapter 4, Arendt explains why the US Constitution was revolutionary. While the Constitution protected citizens from government overreach in the Bill of Rights, this was also something that limited monarchies already did. Its revolutionary aspect was that it protected citizens from the tyranny of the majority through a system of checks and balances, with powers divided among the three branches of the federal government and between the federal and state governments. America’s Founding Fathers were followers of the 18th-century French philosopher Montesquieu, who advocated for the separation of powers in government. The power of each branch checks, but without destroying, the power of the others. The Americans also benefited from the fact that the colonists were already organized in a dense network of local and regional self-governing bodies.

Whereas the French revolutionists conflated power with violence, Arendt contends in Chapter 5 that the Americans saw power as deriving from the actions and mutual promises of people who have joined together for a common purpose. Another key difference was that in France, “the people” were invoked as both the law-giving power and the authority legitimizing that power, yet even the revolutionists understood that some external or transcendent source of authority was needed. In America, by contrast, the Constitution derived its legitimacy from the bottom up: It was the outcome of public deliberation in self-governing bodies at multiple levels. Its authority was then institutionalized in the judicial branch through the power of constitutional review.  

Arendt argues in Chapter 6 that, despite their successful establishment of a constitutional republic, the American Founders nevertheless lost touch with the revolutionary spirit of “new beginnings.” This disconnect occurred because they sought to create permanent institutions and because they overlooked the significance of the township councils, where ordinary citizens participated directly in public affairs. They were focused, instead, on political representation, which they saw as the defining feature of republics. In contrast to direct democracy, citizens do not rule themselves but choose representatives to rule over them. Thus, ordinary people exercise political power only on election day, and active participation is once again restricted to the few.

In France, similar local organizations emerged spontaneously during the Revolution, but revolutionary leaders repressed them for violating the supposedly unanimous will of the people. Local self-governing councils emerged spontaneously during every subsequent European revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries, and they were all remarkably similar to one another despite lacking common origins. Like their French predecessors, revolutionists such as Russia’s Vladimir Lenin were initially impressed by these councils, but soon turned against them for threatening the ruling party’s power monopoly. Arendt laments the fact the political parties have come to dominate the governing process in Europe as well as America, once again confining ordinary citizens’ participation largely to election day.