“Now, some twenty-five years later, it is clear that no benign new world order materialized. What exists in many parts of the world as well as in various venues of international relations resembles more a new world disorder. If there were a publicly traded stock called ‘World Order Incorporated,’ it would not have crashed, but it would have suffered a correction, losing at least 10 percent of its value. The world might even be entering bear market territory, something normally associated with a fall of 20 percent. What is worse, no rally is in sight; to the contrary, the trend is one of declining order.” 

This passage refers to a speech that President George H. W. Bush gave at the end of the Cold War in which he spoke of a “new world order” arising from the great changes at hand. Most people were optimistic then that better days were ahead since the great-power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was ending. Looking back a quarter century later, however, the reality was quite different. This is the main theme of the book.

“But in its time, in its day, in the first half of the seventeenth century, this was an enormous breakthrough. Until then, there was little order in the world other than that imposed by the strongest entity. War was a frequent occurrence between and among this or that principality or state or empire. The idea of trying to bring about a world in which there was not, to use modern parlance, nonstop intervention in the internal affairs of others was a major advance. And it helped set the stage for a considerable period of relative stability in Europe.” 

Here Haass refers to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the starting point of his overview of the history of international relations. It was revolutionary in that it established the concept of sovereignty being sacrosanct—no matter the size or power of the nation—ending the long period when might made right. Sovereignty continues to be the cornerstone of relations between states today.

“The result was something of a departure from the Westphalian notion of order, because rather than merely making sure that neither defeated country would be allowed to possess the military means to harm others, what was agreed to was an approach to order that recognized that what goes on within a country’s borders matters not just to its own citizens but to others. And what the victorious Allies thought they needed to do to ensure that there would not be a World War III, as World War II had followed World War I, was to remake their former adversaries, Germany and Japan. 

It wasn’t until after World War II that the essential aspect of Westphalian sovereignty in foreign relations changed to include a state’s internal affairs. It had become clear from the behavior of the Axis Powers that other nations could no longer ignore egregious domestic behavior that would inevitably influence external behavior. The peace after World War I had failed, resulting in another world war, so this time the United States and its allies virtually remade the societies of Germany and Japan, starting with an overhaul of their political systems.